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Trick  or Treat?   
An Examination of Marketing Relationships in a Non-deceptive 
Counterfeit Market  
Abstract  
Counterfeit goods consumption has predominantly been viewed as an economic, cultural, 
ethical/moral, legal and/or information-management issue. Strategies based on these perspectives 
have taken steps to curb counterfeiting (or “piracy”) worldwide. However, counterfeit purchasing 
continues to be increasingly rampant in some territories and at times is almost regarded as a “normal” 
act of consumption. This paper presents an exploratory behavioural analysis of counterfeit marketing 
firms in China, and the interdependent relationships between the legitimate marketing firms, 
counterfeit retailers and buyers who populate the competitive marketplaces within which consumers 
consume. The results indicate that counterfeit marketing firms, as “bad competitors”, approach 
marketing mix variables to promote their unique selling proposition and compete with other retailers 
much like any other form of organisation. At the same time, these counterfeit marketing firms act as 
though consumer behaviour were also environmentally controlled, just like their genuine counter-
parts. The study also reveals a complex bilateral contingency network of interdependent relationships 
operating within the counterfeiting marketplace – networks that appear amenable to explanation in 
operant terms. A generic model deduced from this complex bilateral contingency networks was also 
proposed. Based on this perspective, the author argued that counterfeit consumption is an artifact 
phenomenon of marketing relationships in a non-deceptive counterfeit market.   
KEYWORDS: Counterfeit retailer; marketing relationships; bilateral contingency; business network; 




Counterfeit products consumption is a global problem that has grown significantly with the dilution 
of national boundaries and barriers resulting from common economic/trade agreements, the 
communicative reach of the Internet and modern copying technologies. Counterfeit consumption is 
estimated to account for US$450 billion of retail revenue each year (AGMA, 2004; Miyazaki, 2004). 
Statistics from anti-counterfeiting organisations show that global piracy has no obvious product 
category limitations and that almost every industry has been affected. Counterfeit goods’ 
consumption is almost regarded as normal in many territories.   
To date, previous research in this area has largely emphasised the supply side issues from a genuine 
manufacturer’s perspective only, focusing upon those product classes most vulnerable to illicit 
reproduction, together with associated anti-counterfeiting strategies and technological developments 
employed in combating IPR theft (i.e. Chow, 2003; McDonald & Roberts, 1994; Olsen & Granzin, 1992). 
Similarly, the existing  literature on counterfeit consumption has mainly investigated the 
characteristics and motivations of consumers toward counterfeit goods, along with associated 
demographic variables, psychographic factors and their socioeconomic contexts (i.e. Prendergast, 
Chue, & Phau, 2002; Tom, Garibaldi, Zeng, & Pilcher, 1998; Wee, Ta, & Cheok, 1995).  
Various anti-counterfeiting measures and strategies based on these perspectives have been proposed 
and implemented, including international treaties and enforcement of intellectual property rights to 
prosecute counterfeiters, use of multiple labelling and packaging techniques to make counterfeiting 
more difficult, consumer education via warnings and advertising campaigns, tight control of retail 
stores, and consultations with both government agencies and other industry stakeholders and 
manufacturers. Despite such efforts, however, these strategies designed to eradicate counterfeiting 
activities do not seem to have worked well as piracy continues to thrive around the world. It seems to 
leave too many questions unanswered.   
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Retailers are often blamed for the proliferation of counterfeits as evidenced by the literature. Strategies 
thus are targeted mainly on how law enforcement can help eradicate counterfeit practices. However, 
many perceive the selling of counterfeits as a price discrimination, risk-related and cost free activity, 
and such counterfeit retailers rarely go out of business (Chow, 2003; Papadopoulos, 2004). Research 
indicates that counterfeits keep selling at far beyond the product lifecycles of genuine merchandise. 
Counterfeit buyers and sellers, in fact, appear actively and consciously “working together” to 
construct an increasingly diverse array of physical and virtual marketplaces in which procurement 
activities may be undertaken, sale of counterfeit goods as a deceptive activity being very much in the 
minority in comparison to those circumstances in which consumers actively seek and select a “pirate” 
purchase option. So the questions remain: Who is most responsible for the proliferation of counterfeit 
goods – the counterfeit retailers or the counterfeit-prone consumers in a non-deceptive counterfeit 
market? Apart from obvious price benefits, how do counterfeit retailers approach marketing mix 
variables to promote their unique selling proposition and compete with other counterfeit retailers? 
The willingness of legitimate originations in their motivation to combat counterfeits is also now being 
questioned. Olsen & Granzin (1992) and Chow (2000; 2003) found that retailers would accept the 
responsibility in fighting counterfeits only if government and manufacturers share the obligation. If 
they feel that it is a trivial problem, they will neither share the responsibilities nor support the 
manufacturers and the governmental authorities. Law enforcement targeted at counterfeit retailers 
may not solve the entire problem either. The root of the problem stems from the persistent willingness 
of consumers to purchase counterfeits, and the often robust relationship between buyer and seller, 
together with the conflicting interests between government authorities, counterfeit and authorised 
retailers in a competitive business market. This calls for an investigation of how retailers are 
responding to law enforcement strategies, as well as the functioning of the relationships between 
consumers, counterfeit retailers, and authorised retailers. Further, due to the fact that counterfeiting is 
basically an illegitimate business enterprise, an understanding of the marketing activities involving 
fake merchandise may also contribute to a better understanding of legitimate channels of marketing 
and communicative strategies.   
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Although the existing literature discusses how counterfeit marketing can arise, no theoretical 
framework has yet been proposed, nor used to analyse counterfeit marketing activities. Neither does 
the literature analyse the marketing activities of counterfeit retailers or the interactive relationships 
between counterfeit retailers and buyers, together with other key actors. It is thus important to obtain 
a descriptive understanding of the problem; there is also a need to better understand both the 
marketing function and the context of counterfeit marketplaces. For these reasons, the author here use 
the Marketing Firm theoretical framework and relationship marketing concepts to analyse the 
behaviours of key actors within the non-deceptive counterfeit marketplace.  
The study detailed in this paper depicts the reality of complex bilaterally contingent phenomena and 
introduces its theoretical implications via the use of qualitative research methods.  The paper is 
divided into four parts. In the first section, a conceptual model using operant learning concepts is 
proposed to aid marketers in understanding the activities of counterfeit retailers and the interactions 
amongst all key actors in counterfeit marketing. As counterfeit marketing involves multiple parties’ 
economic exchange behaviours, the use of the Marketing Firm conceptual approach, derived from 
operant theory, is therefore deemed appropriate (Foxall, 1998). The author adapt and extend Foxall’s 
model of the Marketing Firm to represent the situation as a managerial response to an external 
competitive environment in which the counterfeit retailer is bilaterally contingent upon consumer 
behaviours (such as consumer high demand and purchasing behaviours) and/or the orthodox 
stakeholders’ marketing activities (such as advertising, promotional efforts, and anti-counterfeiting 
strategies). All parties in the counterfeit marketplace try to predict and control the behaviour of others. 
Each party enters this relationship only because it maximises their economic benefits, reduces 
transaction costs, and they remain in it for only as long as it reduces transaction costs. This conceptual 
model provides a formal framework with which marketers can precisely identify and examine the 
managerial and policy implications of counterfeit marketing.  
Following the formulation of the theoretical framework, the second section of the paper explains the 
need to adopt embedded theory and a research design based on the comparison of multiple cases (Yin, 
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2003). Following the case approach, this study gathered various sources of qualitative data, and 
analysed them by comparing different reciprocally reinforcing relationships and networks using the 
embedded theory approach. Finally, the paper concludes by highlighting both the conceptual and 
practical implications of the data and outlining potential marketing implications.  
Literature Review   
The Marketing Firm (Foxall, 1998) is a model of the manner in which a business entity (individual 
entrepreneurs, SMEs, large multinationals) operates to influence consumer behaviour under particular 
economic-structural conditions, those which induce consumer-orientated management by the 
business as a whole. The effective Marketing Firm capitalises upon the instrumental nature of the 
consumer’s behaviour to manipulate a variety of cues that are present during a buying episode, 
promoting acquisition of the goods on offer by maximising positive outcomes and minimising 
aversive consequences. More specifically, the marketing firm model locates the firm’s behaviour at the 
situational interaction with consumer behaviours and their positive/aversive outcomes, the actions of 
the latter upon the former serving to identify those cues that may reliably signal the likely 
consequences of available marketing strategy options. Put another way, firms routinely shape their 
behaviours in the marketplace in response to the aggregate behaviour patterns of consumers 
themselves.  If a particular marketing strategy is effective at the macro, monadic and/or tactical levels, 
the firm will repeat or enhance that marketing strategy. In operant terms, the behaviour of the 
customer thus constitutes a form of discriminative stimulus (SDs) within the firm’s behaviour setting, 
performance metrics of purchase or non-purchase serving as sources of positive reinforcement and/or 
aversive consequences for the marketers; a mutually interdependent relationship as embodied within 
the concept of the bilateral contingency itself, as shown in Figure 1. It is a conceptual stance that 
directs attention firmly toward the interaction between consumers’ and marketing firms’ behaviours 
at the micro level, rather than the macro-level.  
FIGURE 1 HERE 
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As Figure 1 shows, consumer purchasing behaviour is preceded by a discriminative stimulus, 
provided as a consequence of the marketing firm’s behaviour. The behaviour of the consumer has 
consequences which are proximal causes of further action by the marketing firm. As previous research 
of consumer choice has suggested (e.g. Foxall, 1990; e.g. Foxall, 1993; Hackett & Foxall, 1997; Leek, 
Maddock, & Foxall, 1998; Oliveira-Castro, Ferreira, Foxall, & Schrezenmaier, 2005), discriminatory 
stimuli within the retail behaviour setting (SD), subject to their interaction with an individual’s unique 
leaning history of encounters with identical/similar behaviour settings in the past, serve as signals that 
shape the consumer’s response to a product and/or service (Rc), and that response in turn duly 
delivers positively or aversively reinforcing consequences (SR/A); an operant process that is concurrent 
with the classic Skinnerian three-term contingency (Skinner, 1969).   
At the same time, however, the marketing activities of the firm also constitute operant behaviours in 
themselves; behaviours which equally conform to the three-term contingency in a manner that is 
contingent upon the behavioural responses of the firms’ customers, as described above. That is, the 
behaviour of consumers in the marketplace forms part of the competitive environment (i.e. the 
behaviour setting) within which the firm operates, and thus constitutes a form of discriminative 
stimulus (SD). Depending upon those customer responses, the firm will engage in a series of marketing 
activities (Rm) that will in turn be either positively or aversively reinforced by subsequent consumer 
responses to those marketing activities (SR/A). As illustrated by the two broken lines in Figure 1, the 
behaviours of marketer and consumer are thus interdependent, i.e. bilaterally contingent upon one other. 
Consumer behaviour is a component of the firm’s behaviour setting, marketing activities being 
reciprocal behaviours that are directed towards influencing the behaviour setting of the consumer in 
order to seek to elicit the behavioural response that is the customer’s purchase of that firm’s 
goods/services. Put another way, marketing is a behaviour the firm engages in as a way of both influencing 
and responding to the behaviour of its customers. Conversely, buying is a response to, and trigger for, 
marketing actions from the firm.   
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The nature of the marketer-customer relationship thus becomes clear, together with the implications 
of that relationship for strategic marketing management. The goal of the retail organisation is to predict 
and control the behaviour of its consumers in such a manner that the firm maximises positive 
reinforcement (e.g. profit making) and/or minimises negative consequences (e.g. costs) of its market 
activities, as measured by the extent to which consumers acquire and use, consume and dispose of, the 
firms’ market offering.  
In fact, it is more than a simply an exchange between firms and consumers, as manifest in much of the 
relationship marketing literature. Other actors play prominent roles in the exchange networks also, 
either directly or indirectly, from the actions of governments seeking to regulate this exchange, 
through to the behaviours of competitors. A similar pattern of contingencies exists when two rival 
firms, or between a customer and a supplier, and both entities are therefore actively and deliberately 
involved in behaviour setting and reinforcer management.  
The basis of the bilateral contingency is the mutual closure of the parties’ behaviour setting scopes. To 
illustrate this, consider the problem of marketing firms’ competition within orthodox purchasing 
contexts. Many other firms may well be vying for the patronage of the individual consumer in any 
buying situation, a number of actors possibly attempting to procure business through their own 
market behaviours; i.e. there are other firms seeking to “close” a consumer’s behaviour setting at any 
given moment in time, each engaging in their own marketing behaviours. A supermarket such as 
Tesco, for instance, may engage in marketing activities emphasising price and value in an attempt to 
influence the grocery buyer.  In response to this, or perhaps as an antecedent to Tesco’s actions, a rival 
firm such as Sainsbury may develop a competing marketing strategy that emphasises quality and 
choice in respect of produce range.  Ultimately, the two retailers are vying for the patronage of the 
individual consumer.  At a strategic level, however, many of their marketing behaviours may in 
reality be stimulated by the behaviour of their rivals; i.e. Firm A takes this action in the marketplace, 
so Firm B responds in this particular way.  One firm’s behaviour is a component of the other firm’s 
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competitive behaviour setting, and vice versa.  In short, the two firms’ marketing behaviours are also 
bilaterally contingent. 
Of course, the competitive environment of the retail firm is rarely an entirely open one.  Indeed, many 
of the marketing behaviours that retailers may engage in are in themselves enabled and constrained 
by both the dynamics of the market economy itself and, more importantly perhaps within the context 
of this paper, by the regulatory environment generated by legislators and other parties. Thus, the 
behaviour of the Government, for instance, may influence the behaviour of retailers or – particularly 
in instances where legislation is a direct consequence of retailer abuse of power – Government 
behaviour may be contingent upon the behaviour of the firm(s) within the marketplace.  
The study which follows applies empirical approach to examine different types of bilaterally 
contingent relationships in a counterfeit marketplace, thereby relating the interactive behaviour 
patterns that may result in derived reinforcement of counterfeit consumption. The interactive 
behavioural network produced shows the necessary conditions which collectively have an impact on 
the competitive interactions between all parties involved. The result of such interactions has an impact 
on counterfeit goods consumption, either in the scope of the behaviour setting or the availability of 
anticipated exchange reinforcement.   
Methodology 
3.1 Context and phenomena 
This study applies the case method and selects the counterfeit retailing industry in China as the 
research context to illustrate the marketing behaviours and bilaterally contingent relationships of key 
actors. The data used in this research were gathered from multiple sources. Besides interviewing 
counterfeit retailers, interviews were also conducted with counterfeit buyers, authorised 
retailers/manufacturers, and staff from legislatures and anti-counterfeiting agencies. Secondary data 
were also collected, including corporate reports of legitimate manufacturers/retailers and materials 
published by anti-counterfeiting agencies, as well as regulations, speeches/statements from 
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international governmental organisations. Furthermore, mainstream and business press coverage of 
counterfeiting issues, together with more unorthodox sources such as “chat room” and “Web blog” 
discussions by consumers and the counterfeiters themselves, were also examined. Data collected from 
multiple sources in this way help enhance the completion and validity of the qualitative data.  
In order to investigate the counterfeit retailer’s marketing behaviour and the bilaterally contingent 
relationships at work in the marketplace, this study purposively chose the counterfeit retailers of the 
wholesale centres in China as a research focus because China remains one of the world’s largest 
producers of, and markets for, counterfeit goods  since the early 1990s after the success of ‘market-
orientated’ reforms (Wenhai, 2004). A study by the PRC State Council Research Development Centre 
reported in 2001 that the Chinese economy was flooded with between US$19-$24 billion worth of 
counterfeit goods. Brand owners in China estimate that 30 percent of all well-known brands in China 
are counterfeits - everything from Tide detergent and Budweiser beer, to Marlboro cigarettes (Gale-
Group, 2000), and estimate their losses to be in the region of tens of billions of dollars per year. 
Counterfeiting is estimated to now account for approximately 8% of China’s GDP (China Business 
Review, 2000; Hsiung, 2003; US  Senator, 2004).  
Non-deceptive counterfeiting is now a common marketing phenomenon in retail areas where goods 
are purveyed in luxurious boutiques (SAIC, 2002; BBC, 2003; Porteous, 2001; Yao, 2005). It is possible 
to procure counterfeit copies of those goods in lesser stores, local wholesale markets and from street 
vendors, a co-existent relationship in which the marketing of the former almost serves to ‘feed’ the 
latter, and vice-versa. The counterfeit industry in China is an omnipresent economic phenomenon 
over products crossing the whole country (Chow, 2003). The non-deceptive counterfeit retailing 
industry in China consists of counterfeit producers, subcontracted manufacturers, counterfeit retailers, 
third parties such as local governments, private business-dominated wholesale centres, and 
counterfeit consumers, which is itself illustrative of the rich exchange features of a network market. 
Therefore, the theoretical dimensions of this study can be illustrated by investigating multiple bilateral 
exchange relationships within the counterfeit marketplaces of China.  
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Moreover, given China appears to be one of the most developed counterfeit marketplaces in the world, 
it holds a number of key advantages in terms of its suitability as a context for this research. Firstly, in 
terms of access to counterfeit retailers and consumers, the near ubiquity of counterfeit goods and their 
acceptance as a “normal” aspect of business and shopping renders this a location in which securing 
cooperation would be far easier than in, say, the UK where the counterfeiting problem retains more 
overtly illicit in character and consumers may, as a result, be less open about their buying habits. In 
particular, it is easier to obtain the data and information from the counterfeit retailers in China. 
Secondly, and related to this, the rapid rise in counterfeit purchasing in Europe in recent years means 
that this behaviour still has a degree of “novelty” value.  As a consequence, consumer buying and 
firms’ selling patterns may be less stable and more erratic than in a more established market context 
such as China, making data analysis more problematic. 
This work analysed key actors’ marketing behaviours, and the bilaterally contingent marketing 
relationships between counterfeit buyers, authorised retailers, counterfeit retailers and third parties 
such as local governments, who populate the competitive environment of this complex and multi-
faceted commercial arena, illustrated in Figure 2. Ultimately, the objective was to understand the 
extent to which the dynamic inter-relationships between these key actors have a significant impact on 
the counterfeiting consumption which serve to shape consumer response to illegitimate products and 
services.  
As Figure 2 shows, there were potentially four key bilaterally contingent relationships (R1, R2, R3, and 
R4)) to examine; between counterfeit retailers, authorised marketing firms, and third parties to the 
consumer. Each key actor’s behaviour may influence the behaviour of the other three actors – the 
behaviour of each actor may be contingent upon the behaviour of the firm(s) within the marketplace, 
whether legitimate or illegitimate.  
FIGURE 2 HERE 
3.2 Method  
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The investigation conducted an in-depth inquiry of the market behaviours of counterfeit retailers, 
authorised retailers, third parties (local governments) and consumers, together with the relationships 
and networks between key actors in the counterfeit marketplace in China. It was necessary to clearly 
define separate bilateral interaction behaviours, each predicted and controlled by discriminative 
stimuli and the consequences of behaviours of key actors as units of analysis (or focal bilateral 
relationships). Based on the actual structure of counterfeit marketing as illustrated in Fig 2, four key 
actors’ behaviours and four key hypothetical bilaterally contingent marketing relationships around 
consumers were selected as study samples.  
To study interdependently reinforcing behaviour dynamics in the counterfeit marketing, this 
investigation adopted the case study method of Yin (1994) as a basic research approach. Additionally, 
the work applied multiple case comparisons using the embedded theory framework, also proposed by 
Yin (1994), as its main research strategy.  
4. Research analysis and findings 
The study chose four key actors’ marketing behaviours and four key relationships as research 
populations. Each focal bilaterally contingent relationship and its associated effects will be discussed 
individually later. Table 1 illustrates the analytical results of four key actors’ behaviours in an operant 
terms, including interdependent actors, discriminative stimuli, marketing responses and activities, 
and reinforcement of the marketing behaviours. The analytical results include focal bilaterally 
contingency relationships and related reciprocally reinforcing effects, the scope of behaviour settings, 
and the impact of the reinforcement of relational exchanges on proceeding interactions, listed in Table 
2. Moreover, Table 3 illustrates the analytical mechanism for the construction of a generic bilateral 
contingency network model. 
4.1 The Behavioural analysis of counterfeit retailers, authorised retailers, third parties, and 
consumers (Table 1)  
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Regarding the Stimuli-Response-Reinforcement paradigm and the Marketing Firm theory, some 
research findings are illustrated below: 
(1) Buyer behaviour patterns appear to function as an operant process in the counterfeit marketplace. 
Consumer acquisition of counterfeit products is significantly associated with particular behaviour 
setting variables, direct/indirect experiences of counterfeit goods, the positive reinforcement 
retailers provide, and consumer expectations. That is, the exchange benefits offered by a 
counterfeit retailer (stimulus) influence the positive outcomes expected by the purchaser 
(reinforcement), which in turn influence those customers’ loyalty toward the counterfeit retailer 
(response). The findings show that features of the physical environment and temporal setting 
exert a powerful effect upon consumer choice, including factors such as store location, availability 
and organisation of non-deceptive wholesale markets, availability of a comprehensive range of 
products (branded counterfeits and/or unbranded fashion goods), price differentials, retail format, 
bargain-seeking experiences, the warranty services policies and fashion information opportunities 
offered by counterfeit retailers, directing the individual towards those retail facilities likely to be 
of interest. Within this continuous open-closed behaviour setting, consumers are repetitive in their 
purchasing and like to regularly browse in this market.  
(2) Counterfeit retailers’ behaviour patterns also lie in the Sd-R-Sr/a paradigm. Like orthodox 
marketing firms, most counterfeit retailers do their business in legitimate and private wholesale 
centres, administrated by the local Administration of Industry and Commerce (AIC). In those 
centres, counterfeit retailers are actually legitimate firms. The products that the counterfeit 
retailers sell not only include well-known branded “A”, “B” grade and “grey market” counterfeits, 
but also include genuine unknown branded and local branded goods. Under such market 
conditions, counterfeit retailers do appear to have the same “marketing mix” strategies 
functioning as any other legitimate marketing firm, but normally at a lower cost. Most sellers of 
counterfeit products have complete policies for exchange, replacement or refund, for instance, to 
ensure they follow the regulations of the wholesale centres and provide consumer satisfaction.  It 
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is also worth noting that counterfeit retailers do have their own “pseudo-brands” within this 
industry, the know-how technology to produce them, the promotional means to advertise 
effectively (word of mouth, direct salespeople to promote goods outside and inside the market), 
and their own distributors delivering goods to different customer segments, and with different 
segment-specific levels of pricing.         
These market entry conditions, such as no or few market barriers and high demand for known 
branded products (stimuli), may influence counterfeit retailers’ expected maximisation of rewards 
(reinforcement), which influences those counterfeit retailers’ continuous selling behaviours and 
their stay in the market (response) with other actors.   
Adoption of the counterfeit products selling option is undoubtedly determined by the buoyant 
demand that satisfies one level of consumer needs at a premium price, offering positive 
reinforcement to the buyer (delivering value). Consumer behaviour in the marketplace (RC) 
therefore is a setting-level variable (SD) for counterfeit retailers, guiding their marketing 
behaviours. 
FIGURE 3 HERE  
 In addition, the counterfeit retailers’ marketing behaviour and production capacity relies heavily 
upon genuine brand owners and/or manufacturers because counterfeit products are unauthorised 
copies of goods whose manufacturers/retailers bear the bulk of the marketing costs. The 
authorised retailers’ marketing behaviour (RL) is thus another setting-level variable (SD) for 
counterfeiters’, as shown in Figure 3. The consumer’s consumption behaviour and the authorised 
retailer’s marketing behaviour also determine reinforcement SR/A (profit or loss) for the counterfeit 
retailers. Counterfeit retailers therefore are actively and deliberately involved in the manipulation 
of the settings of consumers and authorised retailers alike in self-interested pursuit of 
maximisation of positive reinforcement and minimisation of aversive consequences. Consumers 
and authorised retailers also collectively control the behaviour of counterfeit retailers and the 
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degree of reinforcement/punishment they receive, including their profit or loss, through future 
market offerings and engagement.  
(3) Authorised retailers, by virtue of their distributorship status with the manufacturer, are 
responsible for market-creating activities, which include advertising, promotions and other 
marketing actions. They have control over the range of products, the authorised availability of 
products, the level of advertising, and the layout of the store, etc. However, they cannot prevent 
the consumer from buying counterfeit goods because of relatively open market settings. For 
example, genuine manufacturers and/or authorised retailers first decide to advertise their 
products to build up market demand, an action that is observed by counterfeit retailers. Then both 
retailers choose products simultaneously, but counterfeit retailers have a very low cost base and 
can sell the product earlier and cheaper than authorised retailers.  Consumers therefore face a 
relatively open marketplace to apply their decision rules to respond to this situation, buying 
counterfeits or non-counterfeits depending upon situational factors.   
However, aspects of the environmental setting also exert a powerful effect upon the authorised 
retailers’ responses to counterfeit products sales. The local market size, the capacity of ‘know-
how’ technology, the low cost of labour, and consumer demand for Western goods, all serve as 
influential factors guiding the authorised retailers’ and firms’ actions in that marketplace. Such an 
observation is perhaps unsurprising given that developing countries like China are likely to be the 
most stimuli-rich of all behaviour settings, and a constant stream of references to various aspects 
of the setting directing orthodox stakeholders’ marketing responses. On the other hand, the 
findings reveals lax regulation and the true potency of the ambiguous attitudes of legal authorities, 
together with the different definitions and standards of counterfeiting held, creating a confusing 
and contradictory environment within which orthodox stakeholders must formulate a response 
either tolerant, ignore or anti-counterfeiting strategies.   
Under such market conditions – counterfeit retailers’ marketing activities, third parties’ policies 
and consumer demand (stimuli) may influence authorised retailers’ positive and aversive 
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outcomes (reinforcement), which influence marketing strategies (responses) toward counterfeit 
goods – anti-counterfeiting, utilising or ignoring counterfeiting.  
As examined above, the authorised retailers’ marketing strategies (RL) towards counterfeiting are 
but one component of behaviour settings of the counterfeit retailers (ScD). The authorised retailers 
also constitute components of the behaviour setting of consumers. A number of studies of 
marketing relationships have manifest that the mutuality relationships between legitimate entities 
and their customers are achieved by manipulating the discriminative stimuli present when 
consumer is in a shopping environment in order to increase the probability that a consummatory 
response will be emitted (e.g. Gronroos, 1994; Hunt, 1983; Johnson & Selnes, 2004; Morgan & Hunt, 
1994; Payne, 1995). Manipulation of the cues present during a buying episode by a marketing firm 
will alter the likelihood of a purchase response, those cues setting the occasion for such responses. 
That is, an authorised company’s marketing behaviour (RLM) is therefore a setting-level variable 
(SD) for both counterfeit retailers and consumers’ marketing behaviours, as shown in Figure 4 
below. The counterfeiter’s behaviour (RCM) is a setting-level variables (SD) for authorised retailers’ 
activities. Given the context of the counterfeiting trade and its often illegal characteristics, third 
parties’ behaviour towards counterfeiting (RL) directly forms part of the counterfeit behaviour 
setting (SD) within which illicit selling occurs, whilst the marketing behaviour of the counterfeit 
retailers concurrently represents a component of the behaviour setting of third parties.  
FIGURE 4 HERE 
(4) Third parties include AIC and other local authorities. Third parties in this market regulate the 
market order, administer markets, develop the local economy, implement laws, and build up 
public image. The wild spread of counterfeiting has occurred in part because unemployment 
became a growing problem in late 1980s in China. Counterfeit retailers or manufactures can create 
jobs, whether lawful or not, in a country with an unemployment problem and there can thus be 
tolerant of counterfeiting activities; it is acceptable and welcomed by most of the governments. 
For example, some studies have estimated that counterfeiting in China accounts for as many as 3 
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to 5 million jobs, and revenues of US$40 to $80 billion, at a time when unemployment is a growing 
problem (Asian Times, Chow, 2000; Asian Times, 2004). The financial, physical, social and 
economic structural setting (stimulus) offered by the counterfeit retailers influence the third 
parties’ anticipated rewarding such as solving unemployment problem, profit or tax making 
(reinforcement), which influence third parties’ supporting and protection(response) to counterfeit 
retailers.  
On the other hand, third parties also control the authorised retailers’ marketplace. The department 
stores and luxury boutiques are administrated by third parties. They have an obligation to protect 
the legitimate company’s benefits, providing a sounder investable environment for well-known 
branded marketing firms in order to increase the investment for developing local economies. 
Therefore, the financial, physical, social and economic structural setting (stimulus) offered by 
authorised retailers influences third parties’ anticipated rewards such as development of local 
economies, a particular public image(reinforcement), which influences third parties must protect 
authorised retailers’ benefit (response) as well. As with consumers, the capability to engage in 
consumption, as well as stable economic and social settings offered by the consumers (stimuli), 
influences third parties’ positive outcomes (reinforcement), which in turn influences the third 
parties’ protection of consumers (response).  
Given the nature of counterfeiting, a behaviour infringing intellectual properties in general, third 
parties such as local government are a key actor in this level of marketing relationship, directly or 
indirectly mediating all other actors’ behaviour setting variables and they are mutually reinforced 
by other actors’. That is, the legislature is a mechanism for closing the behaviour settings of all 
parties in mutually acceptable ways, which it does not only by economising transaction costs but 
by increasing the surplus of revenues over all costs including those of open market transactions.  In 
this case, the third parties’ regulation of counterfeiting (RL) is an SD for both authorised and 
counterfeit retailers. RL also determines SR/A of the third parties of local government which means 
that legislatures are actively and deliberately involved in the manipulation of counterfeit and 
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authorised retailers’ setting scopes and in reinforcement manipulation, as shown in the Figure 5 
below. 
FIGURE 5 HERE 
As indicated above, the cycle of bilaterally contingent relationships between third parties and 
counterfeit and authorised retailers mutually and reciprocally rely upon one another.  The behaviour 
of third parties may influence the behaviour of counterfeit and authorised retailers or, particularly in 
cases where legislation is a direct consequence of retailer (either legitimate or counterfeiters) abuse of 
power, the behaviour of legislatures may be contingent upon the behaviour of the firm(s) within the 
marketplace.  
4.2. Bilateral contingency relationships between counterfeit retailers and consumers (See Table 2) 
In order to understand how the interaction of all key actors occurs, what content of literal exchange 
reinforcement they obtain and what the scope of the behaviour setting each actor is in, it is necessary 
to further consider the bilaterally contingent relationship between all key actors in some detail. As 
analysed above, counterfeit retailers sell both counterfeits and un-known branded goods in the market. 
They are regulated by third parties (such as AIC) as a legitimate firm in a wholesale centre. Regarding 
the bilateral contingency exchange relationships between counterfeit retailers and consumers, some 
research findings are illustrated below: 
(1) Exchange reinforcers (value) between counterfeit retailers and consumers lie in acquiring high-
fashion and pre-release goods (big range of well-known branded clothes, shoes, accessories; un-
known branded fashion goods, DVDs and software), fashion knowledge and trends, bargain 
experiences, after-sales service, lower prices, organised markets and profits, credits, customer 
loyalty etc. These reinforcers between other parties could positively or negatively affect the 
success of the exchanges.  Firstly, the positive effects of consumer purchases for counterfeit 
retailers are that third parties (e.g. AIC) assure the quality and service of both counterfeits and 
non-counterfeits, while the negative effects are that third parties limit the size and style of the 
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outlets in the marketplace, and determine the kind of marketing firm (self-employed 
entrepreneurs) that can enter in this marketplace. This negatively reinforces the decreasing of 
selling of counterfeit products because of the high rents in the wholesale market.  Secondly, due to 
the fact that counterfeit goods are copies of genuine articles, the negative consequences also 
include those anti-counterfeiting strategies aimed at limiting counterfeit goods in the longer term 
and offering stability to consumers. Thirdly, the legitimate entities’ premium price system and 
latest product information ensure that counterfeit retailers’ price advantage and fashion trends 
always attract many consumers into the market. Finally, the negative effect to the counterfeit 
retailers is that authorised retailers always control consumer and counterfeit retailer’s products 
resources because of the nature of counterfeits as copies.  
(2) The fact that counterfeit retailers directly or indirectly manage the consumer behaviour setting 
from relatively open to relatively close can be observed in all of the reciprocal reinforcements as 
shown in Tables 1&2.  
(3) The reciprocally reinforcing relationship between consumers and counterfeit retailers is 
influenced by the interactions between authorised retailers and consumers, and between 
counterfeit retailers and third parities (such as local government). Additionally, the focal 
relationship is influenced by the effects derived from either or both inter-actors and creates a 
bilateral circuit-type of network. Both parties involved in the focal exchange are influenced by the 
overspreading relationships, and besides the interaction between the related actors, there is an 
extensive level of spreading influence of reciprocally reinforcing behaviour.  
The focal relationship forms a bilaterally overspreading relationship system, comprising a loop-like 
circuit network.  
4.3. Bilateral contingency relationships between authorised retailers and consumers (See Table 2) 
Before authorised retailers enter the wholesale market, they must register what branded goods will be 
provided in that market with the AIC. To ensure the quality of the products provided to consumers, 
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third parties such as the AIC regularly assess goods sold, auditing the content of the products (such as 
DVD film) and services provided by the authorised retailers. Regarding the reciprocally reinforcing 
relationships derived between authorised retailers and consumers, some research findings are 
illustrated below: 
(1) The interactive relationship between authorised retailers and consumers originates from 
professional customer-oriented marketing services and products provided by the authorised 
retailers and orthodox distributors to consumers, relatively ensured quality product, social status 
value and customer loyalty, credits for services, and the high economic value of income provided 
by consumers to the authorised retailers.   
(2) The third parties’ evaluation for quality of the product, licensing of products, brand registrations, 
etc positively influences the exchange reinforcements of authorised retailers with consumers. At 
the same time, consumers transfer some knowledge of the counterfeit products offered by the 
counterfeit retailers, positively influencing the relationship of consumers and authorised retailers 
because of the quality assurance and real social status value.  
(3) Overseeing the separate relationship between third parties with authorised retailers, and 
counterfeit retailers with consumers, the additional relationship formed by the exchange of third 
parties with the counterfeit retailers may influence the exchange reinforcers between third parties 
and authorised retailers. Following this, relationships change the exchange reinforcer of the focal 
bilateral relationship.  
(4) The fact that authorised retailers directly or indirectly manage the consumer’ behaviour setting 
from relatively open to relatively close was observed in all the exchange values as shown in Tables 
1&2.  
The exchange relationships between third parties and counterfeit retailers, which are external to the 
focal bilateral relationship (authorised retailers vs consumers), the additional separate influences of 
third parties with authorised retailers, and of counterfeit retailers with consumers, eventually 
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influence the exchange reinforcers of authorised retailers with consumers. This focal relationship, with 
its compound overspreading relationships, forms a bilateral circuit-type network.  
4.4. Bilateral contingency relationships between the third parties and consumers (See Table 2) 
As mentioned above, third parties include the local AIC, tax department, and other regulatory bodies. 
Third parties represent the governmental authorities and have an obligation to protect consumers’ 
benefits and welfare while developing the local economy. However, conflicts occur when consumers 
and marketing firms fight over access to limited product resources. Findings regarding the derived 
reciprocally-reinforcing relationships between consumers and third parties are illustrated below:  
(1) Reinforcing activities of consumers with third parties include offering the increasing capability of 
consumption and credits for protection to third parties, while third parties provide an organised 
and regulated marketplace to ensure the consumers’ welfare by virtue of their authority over 
counterfeit and authorised retailers.  
(2) The fact that third parties directly or indirectly manage consumers’ behaviour settings from 
relatively open to relatively closed were observed in all the exchange values shown in Tables 1&2.  
(3) The interaction between consumers and the legitimate entities is positively and negatively 
influenced by competition among counterfeit and authorised retailers in terms of after-sales 
service, range of products, taxes, administration fees, etc. 
(4) The interactions between consumer and authorised retailers positively influence the interactions 
between third parties and consumers. Similarly, the interactions between counterfeit retailers and 
consumers also positively and negatively affect the interactions of third parties and consumers.   
The reciprocally reinforcing relationship between consumers and third parties is influenced by the 
other reciprocally reinforcing relationships between counterfeit and authorised retailers and between 
retailers and third parties. This focal relationship creates a bilateral overspreading relationship system 
comprising a triangular circuit network.  
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4.5 Bilateral contingency relationships between counterfeit retailers and authorised retailers (Table 
2) 
As mentioned before, third parties directly control or administer both counterfeit and authorised 
retailers. Compared to authorised retailers, counterfeit retailers enjoy more tax discounts and lower 
R&D costs (or even no R&D) and direct advertising cost, because the authorised retailers must follow 
all the market regulations and audit systems. Counterfeit retailers in this market are small 
entrepreneurs who benefit from the governmental preference policy aimed at easing unemployment 
problems and facilitating local protectionism. Moreover, unlike authorised retailers, counterfeit 
retailers’ purchase procedures are more flexible because of the size of the companies involved. In 
particular, counterfeit retailers’ competitive advantage lies in the authorised retailer’s products in 
terms of advertising and R&D costs, which gives them a unique competitive market position. 
Regarding the derived interactive relationships between the counterfeit retailers and the authorised 
retailers, the research findings were as follows: 
(1) The interactively reinforcing relationship between counterfeit retailers and authorised retailers lies 
in the customers’ product knowledge transfer, and the patronage of consumers switching from 
one to another, the user-based market share, and the economic value of mutual support.  
(2) The fact that third parties directly or indirectly manage the consumer’ behaviour setting from 
relatively open to relatively closed was observed in all the exchange reinforcers, as shown in 
Tables 1&2.  
(3) The reinforcers exchanged between the counterfeit retailers and authorised retailers are influenced 
by third parties. The third parties influence this relationship through separate relationships with 
either/both of them.  
(4) The reinforcers exchanged between counterfeit and authorised retailers are also influenced by 
consumer purchase patterns and by the user-based knowledge transfer achieved via its separate 
relationships with either/both of them.  
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(5) The interactions between third parties and counterfeit retailers are more complex and in paradox; 
on the negative side, they restrict the free market mechanism because of the complexity of policy 
regulation and anti-counterfeiting requirements from outside, but on the other hand, they also 
guarantee the market competition advantage of counterfeit retailers over authorised retailers, in 
case the authorised retailers of well-known branded enter into the market due to protection of 
local and national branded products. This has an influence on the authorised retailers’ exchange 
reinforcers with counterfeit retailers. There is evidence to show that authorised retailers use or 
merge the distribution channels of counterfeit retailers as a strategy to enlarge market share in the 
new market or as a market entry strategy.   
(6) The interaction between third parties and authorised retailers can negatively influence counterfeit 
selling activities because of regulations, IPR laws and international agreements with counterfeit 
and authorised retailers, which ensure the market economic order is consistent with the 
international marketplace.  
The focal relationship between counterfeit and authorise retailers result in a bilateral circuit-type 
network.  
5. Propositions and Conclusions  
Based on the preceding analysis of the complex reinforcing relationships between key actors involved 
in the counterfeit consumption process as it operates in the wholesale centres of China, four actors and 
four types of exchange network of bilateral relationships have been found. According to the discovery 
from field data, the author offers the following propositions and insights, which can represent 
theoretical and empirical implications as follows: 
Proposition 1.  The behaviour of marketing firms in the counterfeit marketplace involves the 
management of the reinforcement and scope of behaviour settings of the other parties.  Reinforcement 
includes positive economic utilitarian reinforcement, social benefits, knowledge benefits, technical 
benefits, as well as negative reinforcement effects also (transaction costs, risk, etc).  
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According to Foxall (1999), all mutual social or economic interactions involve reciprocal reinforcement. 
Much of what marketing firms do, whether authorised or unauthorised, is thus directed towards 
changing the reinforcing and/or aversive properties of attributes of their products and brands so as to 
make them more attractive to consumers. They attempt to accomplish this by creating, modifying 
and/or promoting brands and products in the marketplace. Such manipulations of the cues present 
during a buying episode will alter the likelihood of a purchase response due to those cues setting the 
occasion for such responses. Within a counterfeiting context, the counterfeit retailer as a “bad 
competitor” has the same marketing functions in the competitive environment, which include 
managing reinforcers and closing the behaviour settings of consumers in a semi-legitimate format. For 
example, the economic values and the available counterfeit market offered by a counterfeit retailer 
(stimulus) influence customers’ expected positive reinforcers, such as social benefits, economic 
benefits, etc (reinforcement), which in turn significantly influence customer loyalty toward the 
counterfeit retailers (response).   
On the other hand, the counterfeit retailer’s behaviour is also managed and affected by other actors. 
For example, market entry conditions, such as no or few market barriers and high demand for known 
branded products (stimuli), influence counterfeit retailers’ anticipated maximisation of rewards 
(reinforcement), which also influences their continued selling behaviours and market presence 
(response) for consumers and third parties. The preceding analysis demonstrates that to combat 
counterfeit selling activities from retailers who possess a cost advantage, authorised retailers and/or 
third parties should strategically identify what events can function as reinforcers (as aversive stimuli), 
to what extent, for what counterfeit retailers, and under what circumstances rather then actual 
reinforcing events (anti-counterfeiting).  
Proposition 2.  The relationship between counterfeit retailer and consumer, like that between orthodox 
retailer and consumer, can involve both monetary and literal exchanges.   
Foxall (1999) believes that a reciprocally reinforcing relationship exists between marketing firms and 
consumers, achieved through swapping or trading entities that could include economical, technical, 
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knowledge, consulting and social benefits recognised by both parties (Kathandarama & Wilson, 2001). 
This reciprocally reinforcing relationship should involve matters that are perceived as important 
reinforcement input by the other party and can be obtained for, and measured by, monetary or literal 
exchanges. In the counterfeit market, the content of exchange is particular in this case, which includes 
economic utilitarian reinforcement; for example, the counterfeit retailer provides various well-known 
branded products at a fractional price in an organised wholesale market in order to obtain high profits 
and marketing performance through a high-volume low-cost strategy. The consumer also obtains 
economic utilitarian benefit from counterfeit retailers. The exchange content here includes social 
benefits such as mutual reinforcement (protection and high rent and/or tax) between third parties and 
counterfeit retailers as a means of resolving unemployment issues. Whilst between counterfeit and 
authorized retailers, the exchange content include fashion and technical knowledge transfer from each 
other through consumer switch behaviour. The analysis in this study demonstrates that some 
reciprocally reinforcing behaviour exist in an interaction network in the counterfeit industry in China. 
Proposition 3.  Previous reciprocally reinforcing behaviours can affect either or both focal bilateral 
exchangers. Therefore, the derived effect can have a bilateral impact.  
Bagozzi (1975) and Webster (1992) perceive a highly developed exchange relationship as a linkage of 
dyadic exchanges. Along with the extensive linkage of the related reinforcing behaviour of one or both 
interactors, a network exchange system is established by all of the related behaviours. Marketing 
theory traditionally views dyadic exchange as a core activity of marketing behaviours (Kotler, 2000) 
which should be explored using the marketing firm theory and the network perspective. Accordingly, 
the network of exchange behaviours interact with one another, thus forming an internally-dynamic 
exchange system based on the bilateral contingency approach.  
Proposition 4. Transfer relationships of focal exchange reinforcers may affect one another. Hence, the 
relationships of derived reinforcement effects can be of a bilateral-circuit type.  
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In a network exchange system, any dyadic exchange reinforcer influences, or is influenced by, the 
inbound related exchange reinforcement and the scope of the behaviour setting. That is, the exchange 
reinforcement shifts with network linkages. This network may be a circuit system when the shift 
reinforcement forms a closed loop, otherwise it is an open system. The reinforcement shift in circuit 
systems stimulates the original exchange relationship because of the reinforcement linkage cycle. 
Conversely, an open system can only create discrete reinforcement outcomes. The exchange 
reinforcement of a shopping episode is thus created based on former exchange experience with 
mutual reinforcement (Foxall, 1998; Grönroos, 1990 ). Within the counterfeit industry in China, the 
bilateral circuit-type exchange network was generated as show in the Figure 6.  
FIGURE 6 HERE 
This type of network is based on the bilateral contingency approach, which faces two independent 
sources of derived reinforcement effects from both interactors in a focal relationship.  This bilateral 
contingency network is highly associated with those marketing systems regulated by social rules, 
regulations and laws. In other words, the bilateral contingency network of the counterfeit market 
forms a complex, closed and derived bilateral contingent effects mechanism. The dynamics of this 
closed system require lengthy adaptation to approach a firm and consumer state. Focal interaction 
must be analysed from the bilateral contingency approach and the network perspective. Their mutual 
exchange reinforcement must be assessed on the basis of the scope of broader exchange reinforcement 
effects and the behaviour setting. Practitioners should grasp the mutual exchange reinforcement 
events and the scope of the behaviour setting more precisely, irrespective of whether the market is 
regulated or unregulated.   
Proposition 6.  This bilaterally contingent circuit-type network is one factor that results in the co-
existence of counterfeit retailers and authorised retailers.  
The various marketing relationships, plus accompanying mutuality, are essential components of this 
bilaterally contingent circuit-type network in the counterfeit marketplace. That is, when authorised 
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retailers choose to target only one level of market segment (e.g. a risk-averse segment), their optimal 
response is to accommodate counterfeit marketers as long as the latter does not threaten their target 
markets and in particular, only when both parties have reciprocal behaviour settings and reciprocal 
reinforcement. This is illustrated by existing research showing that counterfeit retailers’ selling 
behaviour actually increases market awareness of well-known branded products. In fact, consumers 
draw upon both environmental cues and their own unique learning history in order to procure goods 
in that market place, a variety of vendors vying for the customer’s business. Some of these vendors are 
legitimate manufacturers and retailers, others are nefarious purveyors of counterfeit copies. This 
analysis has revealed a relatively free-market competitive environment in operation; a competitive 
environment which can be summarised according to normative business criteria and strategic 
analytical tools.  
6. Theoretical and Marketing Implications 
6.1 Further Research 
This paper has sought to study contribute to our understanding of how counterfeit marketing firms 
approach marketing mix strategies and marketing activities, and what interactive relationships are 
built between key actors in the counterfeit marketplace. The results of the case analysis suggest that 
the driver of the consumption process is the construction of reciprocal reinforcement and the scope of 
the behaviour setting, from manipulating the effective reinforcers (e.g. utilitarian, social benefits) that 
others can be stimulated to respond to, the scope of the behaviour settings that interactors provide one 
another with, and the expected reinforcing outcomes encouraging them to repetitively engage in the 
behaviour in similar shopping situations. This focus can complement what we know about cognitive 
psychology of consumer choice and the role of buyer-seller marketing relationships toward 
counterfeits by emphasising the role of reciprocally reinforcing relationships. The model of the 
bilateral circuit-type network generated provides propositions about the nature of marketing firms 
and the bilateral contingencies that operate between marketing firms, consumers and third parties in 
continuous open-closed behaviour settings.   
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Based on this perspective, future research focus should be on the measurement of the extent to which 
the reciprocal reinforcement can stimulate consumers and other actors’ responses to counterfeit goods 
consumption. In other words, measurement issues should be concerned with the degree and content 
of reciprocal reinforcement and the scope of the behaviour settings, manipulation/management of 
which may reduce counterfeit products’ consumption.  
Under the paradigm of the buyer-seller relationship, marketing management subjects such as 
resources strategy, product manufacture and supply flow, and buyer-seller interaction and benefit 
assignment with the marketplace, all involve a systematic understanding of the interactional 
relationships within a reciprocally reinforcing network. This investigation identifies a derived 
bilaterally contingent pattern network in the counterfeit marketplace.  
Using this bilateral-contingent network paradigm, research can be further undertaken as follows: 
firstly, more research can be conducted to clarify the reinforcement content of interactive relationships, 
the mechanisms of reinforcement transmission among the actors (or exchangers), the ways in which 
marketing firms transform their non-economic reinforcement into economic reinforcement via 
interaction and eventually achieve their goals; secondly, using models with identifiable reinforcing 
effects, researchers can vividly capture actual reciprocal interactions in a complex marketplace using a 
bilaterally contingent network approach; and thirdly, to illustrate the interactional reality more clearly 
and assess the reciprocal reinforcing relationships accurately, more studies must be performed to 
understand possible attrition and limitation among reciprocal interactors within a network. 
6.2 Marketing implications 
The preceding sections have highlighted the different roles that the consumer, the retailer and third 
parties (such as local government) play in contributing to counterfeiting activities. The findings show 
that all parties are co-responsible as each lie at one end of the balance in a bilateral circuit market 
network. The non-deceptive nature of counterfeit marketing is an artefact of the bilaterally contingent 
marketing relationships at work in the marketplace. The real question is the extent of illegitimacy. In a 
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non-deceptive counterfeit market, counterfeit products’ consumption is not necessarily bad for the 
authorised retailers/ distributors, third parties and consumers.  
Because market competition is intensifying, it is difficult for firms to create diverse and innovative 
products and/or services to fulfil all levels of consumer needs based solely on their own resources and 
abilities. Through commercial transactions or trade negotiations, marketing firms can unify useful 
external resources, predict and control the operations of interactors, and can finally deliver the 
promised value to the market. When the authorised and counterfeit retailers are targeting different 
marketing segments, a large market demand and external network effects are generated. The 
authorised distributors have no incentive whatsoever to terminate the opportunistic counterfeit 
marketers because of the mutual exchange reinforcement. This is in direct contrast to the usual advice 
given to the authorised distributors by proponents of the price differential issues explanation to 
prohibit sales of counterfeit goods in a non-deceptive marketplace. There are circumstances when the 
firm’s sustainable competitive advantage can be improved because non-deceptive counterfeit 
products have a positive impact on the legal version of the product. For example, the authorised 
distributors may want to promote regional or global brands and channel diversion as one way to 
achieve this.  
Rather than “defend at all cost” or “develop the mass market” strategies, non-deceptive products 
piracy and intellectual property misappropriation should be managed by the marketing firm 
depending on the nature of the market and the competition. By carefully managing the mutual 
reinforcement events (e.g. enforcement, fines) and the scope of the behaviour setting (e.g. legal action, 
anti-counterfeiting technologies), marketing firms should be able to extract some of, the benefits of 
network externalities and derive other effects of the interactive relationship, while keeping within 
reasonable parameters lost sales and brand erosion. In order to determine the optimal approach at 
managing anti-counterfeiting efforts, the marketing firms should adjust both side derived effects of 
bilateral contingency relationship.   
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The network compositions constructed represent numerous market realities, consequently the 
findings of this investigation are suitable for application to diverse market firms involved in exchange 
and interactive activities. The marketing firms approach may be a valuable tool for exploring the 
complex market mechanism through which mutually beneficial cooperation can be achieved, 
exchanging the business resources of members and the integrating ways of a whole products value, an 
approach that should eventually be able to realise the common vision of the network. That is, instead 
of anti-counterfeiting, the authorised retailers and third parties may perhaps appropriately utilise 
non-deceptive counterfeit consumption as a strategy through management of behaviour setting and 
reinforcement events. In other words, practitioners should not ignore the derived reciprocal 
reinforcement and its influence; they should deploy control over behaviour settings and create 
reciprocal reinforcement events systematically.  
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Physical  1. Available market 2. High availability of 
product  3. Organised market  
Temporal 1. Cheap price system 2. A fast-fashion goods 
offer 3.short life cycle of goods 4. Fashion season Social 
1. Social status 2. Sharing community 3. Legal market 4. 
Interaction with salespeople  
Regulatory 1. Occasional punishment, lax law 3. Legal 
market  Direct and word-of-mouth experiences  
1. Counterfeit products buying                  
2. Legitimate products buying 
3. Browsing      
4. Introduce other people to the 
market       
5. Share shopping experience  
Positive:  





risk and bought 






Physical: 1. The organised marketplace, distribution 
and supply chain 2. The geographical location of the 
market 3. Customers’ segmentation 4. Outlet, outlet size 
5. Retail format 6. The ‘know-how’ technology available 
7. Product popularity 8. Opportunities for low-cost 
selling.  9. Local economic setting 10. Highly flourishing 
market . Regulatory: 1. The law and regulatory 
mechanisms 2. Lax penalty 3. Weak regulations 4.Local 
protection 5. graduated tighten IPR regulation   
Social:  1. Sales performance 2. Self-employee (Boss) 
3.Social-status  
Temporal:1. Short life cycle of selling same products 2. 
Temporal supply chain 3. Season change 4. initial star-
up business  Direct enterprise Learning History  and 
to observe other firms’ profit  
1. Selling counterfeit goods  
2. Selling legitimate goods 
2. Marketing Mix strategies (4Ps, 
4Cs) 
3. Provide after-sales service 
warranty 
4. Chat with potential consumers  
5. Build up Business connection 
6. Promote un-known and 
known brand  
Positive  
1. HU+LI (Self-
satisfaction and profit 
making)  
2. HU+HI  
3. HI +LU 
 4.  LU+LI 
Aversive  
Occasional tightened 
punishment, and the 









Physical: 1. Counterfeit goods flourish in the market 2. 
Irregular market 3. The organised marketplace, 
distribution and supply chain 4. Retail format 5. 
Customer segmentation 6. Local economic setting 6. 
Retail format Regulatory: 1. The law and regulatory 
mechanisms 2. Lax penalty 3. Weak regulations 4.Local 
protection 5. Local law system 6. weak anti-counterfeit 
policy Social: 1. Market performance 2. Public image 
3.Brand reputation Temporal:(Asset, Capital and Time,  
Season cues) 
Organisation and enterprise direct negative 
experiences and anti-counterfeiting agencies’ 
suggestions  
1. Selling legitimate goods  
2. Marketing Mix strategies (4Ps, 
4Cs) 3. Provide after-sales service 
warranty 
4. Chat with potential consumers 
5. Build up Business connection 
6. Promoting the well-known 
brand 
7. anti-counterfeiting activities  
 
Positive:  
1. HU+LI (e.g. Self-
satisfaction and profit 
making)  
2. HU+HI  
3. HI +LU 
4. LU+LI 
Aversive  
Risk, production cost 
and anti-







Regulatory:1. International law, WTO, international 
IPR regulations 2. Local law system 3. local protection 
4. weak enforcement system Physical: 1. International 
pressure 2. Flourish market 3. Incomplete regulation 
system 4. The developing economic system 5.  Retail 
format 6. Local economic setting  Social: 1. Public 
image 2. International image 3. other social 
environment cues Temporal:(Asset, Capital and Time,  
Season cues, International events)  
Direct experience, international agreement/pressure 
and anti-counterfeit agencies lobby  
1. Tighten law  
2. Administrate markets  
3. Local protection  
4. Building up public image  
5. developing local economic  
6. knowledge transfer 
Positive:  
1. HU+LI (e.g. Self-
satisfaction and profit 
making)  
2. HU+HI  
3. HI +LU 
4. LU+LI 
Aversive  
Risk, production cost 
and anti-
counterfeiting cost   
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Table 2: Bilateral relational exchange value effects of various dyadic exchange  
Impact of the reinforcement of relational exchanges Actors Reciprocal Reinforcing 
activities 
Positive  Negative  Open  Close  Network 
1. Consumer and Counterfeit retailers            
Counterfeit                       
Retailers  
1.Provide large range well-
known branded counterfeits, 
un-known branded fashion 
products, fast changing rate 
of outlet;  
1. AIC enforces fairness and 
richness in both counterfeit 
and non-counterfeit 
products purchases in the 
market  
1. Legislature limits the size 
and style of the outlets in the 
marketplace, products 
attribute and what kind of 
marketing firm can enter in 
this marketplace. 
1. Counterfeit retailers provide a 
relatively open market with big 
rang and popular choice choices 
with affordable price 
1. Counterfeit retailer control 
the product attribute for 
consumers.  
Figure "A" in 
Table 3 
 ↓ 
2 .The organised market and 
distribution, convenient for 
consumers; good location in 
town centre  
2. AIC have to ensures the 
quality of products supplier 
by counterfeit retailers      
2. The legitimate entities sell 
the same goods in the next 
door, which ensure 
counterfeits is copies                   
2. Another consumption choice 
for consumer to shop when they 
in the town centre 
2. AIC control the market is a 
legal market, within which 




3. Exchange and refund 
policy, completed discount 
system like other retailers do 
3. The legitimate retailer’s 
after-sales policy competed 
with counterfeit retailers 
 3. Counterfeit retailer relatively 
open the consumer's social 
settings by proving after-sales 
services  
3. Consumer's setting is 
controlled by counterfeit 
retailers through the after-
sales service (depend on the 
individual firms police) 
  
  
4. Fraction price of well-
known branded goods 
 4. Legitimate entities enforce 
anti-counterfeiting strategies 
to control the price and the 
counterfeits appeared in the 
market 
4.  Because counterfeit retailers 
sell the similar goods with low 
price, which relatively open the 
setting within which consumer 
face to more choice for consume 
similar goods 
 
4. Counterfeit retailers control 
the price system in the market 
which relative close the setting 




5. Provided lots fashion 
information for consumers 
by sales-person 
5. Legitimate entities' 
products information 
ensure the products are 
always in fashion  
5. Legitimate entities 
controlled the product's 
available in the market which 
limited counterfeit retailers' 
own products range 
 
5. Counterfeit retailers relatively 
open the setting by provide the 
more fashion and advance 
information and knowledge 
5. In the market, consumer' 
setting was relatively closed 
by the information counterfeit 
retailer give   
  
  
6. Provided more prince 
space for bargain experience  
6. Legitimate entities' 
premium price ensure 
counterfeit retailers have 
more price differential 
advantage  
 
  6. Counterfeit retailers relatively 
open the settings which 
consumer has big space for 
bargain  
6. Counterfeit retailers 
relatively close setting that 




1. High profit from selling 
counterfeit goods or other 
fashion goods; high turn-
over rate   
No significant effect 1. Tier 1 effect                             
AIC regulates the counterfeit 
retailers sell less fakes 
because of the anti-
counterfeiting policy  
1. Various consumer 
segmentation relatively open the 
counterfeit retailers products 
rang and profit 
1. Consumer's shopping 
preference control the 
counterfeit retailer’s products 
provided in the market.  
Figure "A" in 
Table 3 
   ↓ 
2. Consumer Loyalty: Obtain 
high frequency consumers 
and easy retain consumers 
2. AIC ensure the wholesale 
market in a good or 
convenient location  
 2. Consumers shop in the town 
centre relatively open the 
counterfeit retailers location and 
time  
2. Consumer use the rate of 
patronage shops in town 
centre to control the 
counterfeit retailers' physical 
setting  
  
Counterfeit                       
Retailers  
3. Credits for services 
provided, and obtain more 
old consumers  
3. AIC ensure the 
consumers' benefit  
 3. Due to the different quality of 
after service, consumers relatively 
open the counterfeit retailers' 
social setting  
3. Consumer use the needs of 
good after services to close 




4. Reputation for low-price; 
Credit for well-known 
branded goods  
4. The legitimate entities 
sales systems ensure  
consumers have this 
advantage 
 4. Consumer's utilitarian 
incentive relatively open the 
counterfeit retailers' setting for 
providing cheap price to compete 
with the authorised retailers and 
got more opportunity to enter the 
market 
4. Consumer’s utilitarian 
incentive closes the counterfeit 
retailers' setting for providing 
cheaper price to compete with 
others competitors.   
  
  
5. Credits for knowledge 
provided and obtain more 
consumer back  
5. Legitimate entities' 
products information 
ensure consumers fashion 
knowledge as same as other 
areas 
 5. Consumer's fashion knowledge 
needs or searching information 
behaviour relatively open the 
counterfeit retailer’s 
opportunities to attract consumer  
5. Consumer's fashion 
knowledge needs and search 
information needs behaviour 
relatively close the counterfeit 
relaters' setting for providing 




6. High rate of later-
returning consumers  
    6. Consumer's bargain behaviour 
relatively open the counterfeit 
retailer's setting for profit  
6. Consumer bargain 
behaviour relatively close the 
counterfeit retailers' setting for 
always give price space for 
bargaining 
  




1. Provide authorised well-
known branded products 
1. Legislature's anti-
counterfeiting ensure that 
counterfeit retailers' goods 
have fake characteristics 
1. Counterfeit retailers sell the 
same well-branded product 
with low price, which limit 
certain branded goods 
reputation. 
1. Authorised retailers give 
consumer relatively open setting 
to purchase well-known branded 
goods 
1. Authorised retailers 
relatively close the physical 
setting because of well-known 
branded products are not 
adequate in the market 
Figure "B" in 
Table 3 
   ↓ 
2 .The authorised 
department stores and 
boutiques 
2. Legislatures assure high 
social status and quality of 
goods sold by authorised 
retailers in the department 
store   
No significant difference 2. Authorised retailers give more 
opportunities to consumer for 
choosing and browsing well-
known branded goods and high 
tech goods  
2. Because of the cost of 
licences and characteristics of 
boutiques or department store, 
authorised retailers also 
limited consumers choice for 
more other products  
  
Consumers  3. Provide high price for 
quality insurance products 
3. Legislature enforces the 
authorised retailers 
provided good quality 
products.  
3. Same or more range 
products appear in the 
counterfeit retailers store has 
limited reputation of 
authorised retailers 
3. Authorised retailers provide 
high quality goods which 
relatively open the consumer 
setting for purchasing good 
without worrying   
3. Authorise retailers limited 






advertisement on TV 
 No significant difference 4. Authorised retailers give more 
information, relatively provide 
more opportunities for 
consumers 
4. Authorised retailers 
relatively closed the behaviour 
setting for popular goods and 
entertainments choice  
  
  
5. Provide after-service like 
other retailers do 
3. The counterfeit retailer’s 
policy competes with 
authorised retailer which 
forces them to do better or 
same 
No significant difference 5. Authorised retailers relatively 
open the consumer's social 
settings by proving after-sales 
services  
5. Consumer's setting is 
controlled by authorised 
retailers through the after-
sales service (depend on the 
individual firms police) 
  
Consumers  1. High profit from selling 
well-known branded 
products 
No significant effect 1. Counterfeit retailer’s sale 
the same quality with a little 
difference which result some 
consumer switch to 
counterfeits. This has limited 
authorised retailers' market 
share  
1. Various consumer 
segmentation relatively open the 
authorised retailers'  products 
rang and profit 
1. Consumer's shopping 
preference and the utilitarian 
incentive control the 
authorised retailers' products 
provided in the market.  
Figure "B" in 
Table 3 
  ↓ 
2. Credit for well-known 
brand products and quality 
 2. counterfeit retailers' selling 
behaviour has influenced 
credit of authorised retailers 
2. Consumer's pursuit high social 
status and popular goods give 
authorised retailers more selling 
opportunities  
2.Consumers' unlimited desire 
for social status and well-
known branded goods control 





3. Credits for services 
provided 
3. Legislature ensure the 
consumers' benefit  
 3. Due to the different attitude 
and quality of after service, 
consumers relatively open the 
authorised retailers' social setting  
3. Consumer use the needs of 
good after services to close 





4.  Social status value of 
customer loyalty  
4. Consumers buy the 
authorised goods which 
ensure the quality of the 
products.  
4. Counterfeit retailers in a 
legal and organised market 
and similar goods which also 
offer social status value 
without pay premium price.  
4. Consumer's informational 
maximization needs give more 
authorised retailers opportunities 
for offering special social status 
value  
4. Consumer's informational 
and utilitarian maximization 




3. Consumer and the third parties of local government         
The third Parties 1. Protection of consumption  No significant difference 1. Under legislature protection, 
consumer face more choice  
1. Legislature use the policy to 
control consumer behaviour 
setting for choose right 
products 
Figure "C" in 
Table 3 
  ↓ 
2. Regulation of 
consumption and market  
2. Authorised retailers' anti-
counterfeiting policy 
enforce legislatures regulate 
market order  
2. Counterfeit retailers sale 
the non-deceptive counterfeit 
goods affect the efficiency of 
policy  
2. Because of lax regulation to 
consumer, which related open 
consumers' self-rule setting  
2. Regulated market relatively 
close consumers choice  
  
Consumers  3. The organised and 
regulated marketplace  
  3. Under legislature protection, 
consumer face more choice  
3. Legislature use the policy to 
control consumer behaviour 
setting for choose right 
products   
  4. Provide consumer a price 
and social benefit  
4. Counterfeit retailers 
ensure consumers have 
price's benefit and 
affordable social benefit  
 4. Legislatures open the market to 
more retailers, provide different 
market and department store, 
which relatively open consumer’s 
setting for consumption  
4. Legislatures control what 
products can be sold, which 
directly control the consumer's 
setting 
  
Consumers             
↓ 
1. Credits for protection    1. Consumer's knowledge for 
products relatively open the 
legislatures social setting  
1. The degree of consumer's 
knowledge limited legislatures 
capability to protect  
  
the third parties  2. The increasing the 
capability of consumption  
2. Both counterfeit retailers 
and authorised retailers 
complement consumer's 
capability of consumption  
  2. The consumer's capability to 
consumption give legislature  
more space to open new markets 
2. Consumers' capability of 
consumption stimuli 
legislature in an unescaped 
setting for open more 
resources   
4. Counterfeit Retailers and Authorised Retailers  
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Counterfeit                       
Retailers  
1. Consumer user-base, and 
channel  
1. The third parties ensure 
the market location and 
ambiguous attitudes to 
counterfeits which 
influence more consumers 
purchase  
 1. Counterfeit retailers relatively 
open authorised retailers' setting 
through extend the market  
2. Counterfeit retailers 
relatively close the authorised 
retailers' setting by controlling 
more consumers (no 
significant different) 
Figure "D" in 
Table 3 
   ↓ 
2. Awareness of branded 
goods in the market 
2. The high rate of 
consumer patronage  to the 
market ensure the products 
knowledge's flow 
 2. Counterfeit retailer relatively 
increase awareness of the 
authorised retailers' product 
2. Counterfeit  retailers 
relatively close authorised 
retailer's seeing through 
promoting brand goods by 
themselves only in the 
counterfeit market 
  
Authorised                      
Retailers  
3. Negative sales increasing  3. The third parties regulate 
the market because of the 
protection of IPR  
3. By selling counterfeits, 
counterfeit retailers are relatively 
open the authoriser’s strategies 
choice  
3. Counterfeit retailers use the 
fraction price to relatively 
control the authorised 
retailers' market  
  
Authorised                  
Retailers  
1. The market demand in 
which well-known branded 
products worth copying and 
selling 
1. Consumers benefit from 
non-deceptive counterfeits 
with big rang products 
choice 
 
1. Authorised retailers relatively 
open counterfeit retailers' setting 
by promoting products and 
develop the market share   
1. Authorised retailers 
relatively close the counterfeit 
retailers setting through 
product and brand 
  
   ↓ 
2. Knowledge of products 
and fashion  
2. Consumer demand and 
income ensure the 
Authorised retailers 
develop the product 
2. Consumer's demand for 
counterfeit goods negative 
influence authorised retailers' 
promote the knowledge of the 
products 
2. Authorised retailers relatively 
open counterfeit retailers' setting 
by providing the products 
knowledge and product 
promotion  
2. Authorised retailers 
relatively close the counterfeit 
retailers setting through 
product and brand 
  
Counterfeit                       
Retailers  
3. Anti-counterfeiting policy   3. The third parties regulate 
the market to ensure the 
policy  
  




Table 3 Bilateral Continency Pattern of Relational Reinforcing System
 
